Contingency Preparedness Review

Changes in Latitude?

LT Dan Deptula, Instructor
Contingency Preparedness School, RTC Yorktown

Newsletters can be fun….if you have the time to write them, of course? Creative thoughts flow into words and phrases without mandate to consult the Correspondence Manual or weeks to have the command approve it. Ah, literary freedom…… As the new editor of our newsletter, my first order of business is to emphasize that this is OUR newsletter. You and me, the field and the training center, the ying and the yang, Laurel & Hardy. You get the picture. Together, we can share insight on incidents, issues, and ideas. We'll provide the pep talks, perspectives and policy pointers with support from our HQ gurus. You tell us good stories, successful projects, or lessons learned from the field and I'll bet we'll have one spicy newsletter. Give it try!!

Anyhow, transfer season has come to an end, and like the rest of the Coast Guard, new faces are among the staff here at "CPU". Leaving to join the ranks in the field are: **LCDR Donna Kuebler**, our outgoing school chief, who moved on to the Chief, Environmental Response Branch position at Activities New York, and **LT Judy Persall**, who took her instructing prowess to the newly formed Planning Department at MSO San Francisco. Moving in to join the team at RTC are **LT Mark Emmons** reporting in from MSO Paducah, KY and **LT Dan Deptula** from MSO/Group Los Angeles – Long Beach, CA. Recently promoted **LCDR Dave Haynes** takes over the reins as our new school chief. Dave has been with the school for the last three and a half years, and has seen its responsibilities and curriculum develop into another essential school for Marine Safety and Operational professionals in our service. His experience and knowledge as an instructor and Contingency Preparedness expertise will be passed onto his new Jedi-wannabees.

Webster's reminds us that **latitude** means: **1**. Breadth: range; **2**. Freedom from the usual restraints, limitations, or regulations. And, finally, version 3 discusses its nautically familiar meaning with respect to distance from the equator. What's the significance of this? Before we used this term to help describe the locations of our ships, it was used more to define the ability to influence change. Today, our Contingency Preparedness Program has never been as visible, dynamic, or essential to mission success. I challenge each of you to develop and exercise your own personal, professional, and organizational latitude. Happy Y2K!! See you next quarter.

CGSAILS is underway…

By LT Dan Deptula, Instructor, Contingency Preparedness School

Welcome to the next generation of our lessons learned program: CGSAILS, which stands for **C**oast **G**uard **S**tandard **A**fter Action **I**nformation and **L**essons Learned **S**ystem. For those of you who remember its predecessors, CGULLS and CGSTAARS, you might already be setting up the office pool on its longevity. Though it is true that CGULLS, as we knew it, is dead, and CGTAARS never really developed any gravitation, CGSAILS promises to be seaworthy for a long voyage.

"The ability to access this database from a desktop computer via the internet or Coast Guard intranet will encourage participation and communication for improving our Contingency Response and Preparedness efforts combined, " says **Michael Burt, G-OPF-3** and skipper of the HQ project. "Web-based technology has given us the medium for developing a user-friendly, time-sensitive, easily accessible database to distribute this information to those who need it."

Elements of **<u>CG SAILS</u>** (as of 8/99)

- Both the Operational and Marine Safety Programs are responsible for Coast Guard Lessons Learned and Best Practices.
- Designed to coordinate the review, validation, and dissemination of Lessons Learned, Best Practices and After Action Reports.
- Prototype database created in January 1999.
- Final Internet version to be completed October 1999
- CG Intranet and classified version – SIPRNET, to be developed once internet version fully functional
- Other future efforts include: enhanced search features, refine graphics, develop internal validation process, and export information to Navy & Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- COMDTINST M3010.19A (draft version 7/99) provides format, procedures, instructions, and definitions
- LL and AAR's should be submitted NLT 90 days of termination of operation, response, or exercise.
- Visit http://138.145.28.13 for a glimpse and trial of CGSAILS

Formatting the ACP
By LT Amy Baribeau, G-MOR-2

Area Committees have made impressive strides in oil spill planning since the original OPA 90 Congressional mandate to develop Area Contingency Plan (ACP). The goal was to create plans that not only had all the needed information, but would be useful during an oil or hazardous substance discharge. Area Committees have networked with state and local agencies to create plans that contain volumes of important information, yet the best format to display this information has been debated. With input from throughout the response community, the new ACP format will improve the ACP's utility as a response tool.

The Coast Guard is establishing a functionally-organized plan, aligned with the Incident Command System. To maintain consistency and relieve some of the burden placed on Area Committees to independently collect this information, some input will be provided to the field by the responsible national or regional level. Area Committees may insert this response information directly into their plan, or customize it to suit their local needs. In addition, to accommodate the variability of local and regional circumstances, a degree of flexibility is allowed for within the plan's numeric architecture. Cross-referencing of other plans and information such as Geographic Response Plans and Marine Fire Fighting Plans is also encouraged but not required.

To improve plan management, publishing and distribution, a generic "new format" template will be provided to each unit and District in Standard Workstation III word processing software, Microsoft Word Master Document, along with user instructions to aid with this format transition. A sample "populated" ACP will also be provided. G-MOR will also make the templates available on the CG Intranet at **http:\\cgweb.uscg.mil\g-m\hq\g-mo\mor\mor-2\ACPTemplate.doc** or through the link at **http:\\cgweb.uscg.mil\g-m\hq\g-mo\mor\response.htm**. This new Master Document format will simplify future changes, as it automatically updates the Table of Contents, the index, and other important sections without having to repromulgate the plans completely. Eventually, ACPs will be required to be uploaded on a designated server once they are approved to allow for public downloading of electronic versions. Updates could be posted immediately, and users could print their own ACPs.

G-MOR-2 anticipates that the template and user's guide will be mailed in January 2000, and Area Committees will have until 1 October, 2004 to update their plans using the new format. The G-MOR-2 point of contact is LT Amy Baribeau at 202-267-2877.

Testing your METL's…
By LCDR Jane Cubbon G-OPF-3

You may have seen some of those purple books from DoD floating around your planning spaces. You know the ones. They have all of the service emblems on the covers including the Coast Guard. Those emblems indicate that all of the services are in agreement with the policy expressed in the document. One of those books is due to be updated this fall. It is entitled "Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04A." So what you ask does this have to do with the real world. The Universal Joint Task List or UJTL contains 8 major subject areas or tasks which define all of the things the joint community does to fight a war on foreign soil. All joint exercises are now planned to tie exercise events directly to selected tasks. This makes training and evaluation more uniform. About this time you're saying, "OK, that's nice but what does it have to do with the Coast Guard."

The UJTL is a compilation of the Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) that each service has for a war fight. It's a great document for planning a war but…what about all of the other contingencies and emergencies for which we plan and exercise. We have mission essential tasks or METLs for those operations as well. When we respond to a hurricane or a flood, we know what we need to do because of experience in similar

situations. We share that knowledge with other units faced with similar tasks but we do it informally.

As the world political situation shifts and changes, the Department of Defense is finding itself tasked with many "Operations Other Then War" or OOTW. This means that joint operations are becoming common place. Whether it is rescuing flood victims from Hurricane Floyd to digging our survivors of a Turkish earthquake many agencies are working together. When faced with new or unfamiliar territory, METLs are a means of communicating through common language with other services and agencies.

The Joint Vision is for the UJTL to expand it to contain joint tasks for OOTW scenarios and crises. In order to accomplish that goal, we need to start the process of recording our METLs now. They need to be captured for all of our contingencies. Formalizing those tasks that are common to most units responding to a contingency will allow us to measure and evaluate our own abilities, communicate with the joint community and to better equip all units to respond to contingency operations.

Measuring Readiness

Aggregating Readiness Data From The Tactical, Operational, And Strategic Levels Is Difficult
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN
Armed Forces Journal International, January 1999, Pg. 16

High on the nation's defense agenda is the question of military readiness. It has been the subject of Administration and Congressional attention as well as extensive media coverage. But what is readiness and how is it measured? Let me step outside the Pentagon's framework for thinking about readiness and provide a perspective in plain English.

Readiness can be defined as the nation's ability to have the right forces in the right place at the right time to fight the right war. It consists of seven things; in principle, measuring readiness in each of these areas is a straightforward task:

1. Qualified people. For each unit, we count the number of specialists on hand-pilots, infantrymen, mechanics, etc. - and compare those numbers to the numbers each unit needs.

2. Combat-capable hardware and technology. We compare the capabilities of US military hardware -- ships, tanks, aircraft, etc. -- to those of potential adversaries.

3. Appropriate levels of maintenance, supplies, and spare parts. We track the extent to which hardware is in a "ready-to-go" maintenance status. In simple terms, are the ships ready

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>
> **- Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN**

for sea, can the aircraft fly, can the tanks shoot, and are adequate supplies and spare parts on hand?

4. Training. We track the amounts and types of training our forces have received.

5. Tactics, techniques, and procedures. We ask ourselves, "Do we have tactics, techniques, and procedures that fully exploit the capabilities of our hardware and our people?"

6. Transportation and communication. We ask ourselves if we can move our forces in a timely manner to wherever they might be needed and if we can communicate with them once they are deployed.

7. Infrastructure. We track the extent to which our bases, hangars, maintenance depots, fuel farms, training ranges, etc., are in an "up" status, lest we erode our ability to do maintenance, train our forces, and keep our forces supplied.

Readiness exists on multiple levels, i.e., at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels within our forces.

The tactical level. Are our smallest military units -- squadrons, battalions, ships -- ready to fight? Tactical readiness is the responsibility of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The armed services give their squadrons, battalions, ships, etc., the people, hardware, training opportunities, and funds to attain readiness standards that the services define for these units.

The operational level. There are two forms of operational readiness: "service and joint."

Service operational readiness is the ability of the individual tactical units to form larger, operational-level fighting units such as wings, battle groups, brigades, divisions, Air Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Units, etc. The services are responsible for providing the funds and training environments for this form of readiness.

Joint operational readiness reflects the ability of operational-level fighting units of the individual services to "integrate and synchronize," i.e., to operate in cohesive, coordinated ways with the fighting units of other services (as well as with forces of other nations). This form of readiness is the responsibility of the unified commanders-in-chief (CinCs).

Estimating the service operational readiness of units involves "aggregating the readiness data of tactical units. The complexity in joint operational readiness comes when we try not only to aggregate the readiness data of tactical units from a single service but also aggregate the readiness data of operational units from two or more services. It is possible for our forces as a whole to be in a high state of readiness, even though some units are not at peak readiness.

The strategic level. Strategic readiness combines tactical and operational readiness with all of the additional intelligence, logistics, command-and-control, and transportation systems needed to form a joint warfighting force. It also comprises the readiness of the CinCs' staffs and other federal agencies and departments necessary to put the right forces in

the right place at the right time to fight the right war.

In general, strategic readiness is measured against a large-scale scenario, such as the nation's ability to fight and win two major theater wars that may occur nearly simultaneously. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the catalyst who defines the benchmarks for strategic readiness.

To measure strategic readiness, tactical and operational readiness data must be aggregated even further and combined with other data. At this stage, the data for the force as a whole will often obscure the readiness of individual units, even if they are experiencing significant readiness shortfalls.

Why is measuring readiness difficult? There are five reasons why measuring readiness is easier said than done.

* Readiness depends on the "benchmarks" against which we measure our forces, such as whether they can fight two major theater wars nearly simultaneously Different benchmarks will yield different results.

* Many aspects of our readiness measuring system rely on subjective judgments.

* An automated system that links tactical readiness data to joint operational and strategic readiness data does not exist.

* There is no simple equation for aggregating readiness data from one level up to the next level.

* We also factor in "prudent risk," e.g., the chances of a crisis occurring.

What are the implications? This discussion is perhaps a start to what may be a better way of understanding and measuring readiness. Clearly it needs further development, but this view has the potential to provide a much more useful measurement of military readiness.

Admiral Prueher is the Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Command, headquartered at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

The New Millennium in June

LT Charles Diorio, MSO Los Angeles – Long Beach, CA

ABOARD THE APL SINGAPORE, June 15—At 4:58 this morning, in the foggy solitude of San Pedro Bay, a two-way radio started squawking in the engine control room of this 64,000-ton cargo ship with an alarming message from the captain: "Ron, the engine is not responding."

That same instant, a piercing klaxon and a series of flashing lights alerted Chief Engineer Ron Gerde to the crisis at hand: The Singapore, hauling 1,109 massive steel containers stuffed with everything from tennis shoes made in Malaysia to stereo equipment from Taiwan, had hit a digital iceberg. A year 2000 computer glitch had crashed a critical electronic system that controls engine thrust, causing the vessel, whose bow-to-stern measurement exceeds the length of three football fields, to head uncontrollably toward the Port of Los Angeles.

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It was not exactly Christmas in July, or June for that matter, when the Captain agreed in late May to conduct a Y2K exercise in mid-June. The natural progression of the Coast Guard's Y2K efforts was that someone had to hold an exercise to test our plans. The ideal situation was that it would be another unit and we could read about their drill in this magazine at our desks.

However, MSO-Group Los Angeles/Long Beach was chosen as the site, and instead of enjoying the benefits of another unit's labor, we had three weeks to plan and hold a Y2K drill that one Coast Guard Captain from Headquarters called "one of the most significant (non-emergency) events in recent years." What resulted, according to Captain George Wright, the Captain of the Port Los Angeles/Long Beach, was a drill that furthered "the goal of keeping Los Angeles and Long Beach harbors safe, efficient, and environmentally sound."

In mid-May, all the Coast Guard Captains of the Ports gathered in Washington, DC to discuss the Y2K issue. The COTP's debated the proposed Coast Guard Y2K policy and offered feedback from various industry meetings held in different ports. From this meeting, the consensus was that the Coast Guard would publish regulations regarding Y2K based on the International Maritime Organization's Circular 2121, the "Y2K Code of Good Practice." These regulations would include questionnaires for vessels and facilities, the results of which would be factored into a risk matrix to determine operational controls during the Y2K periods.

Concurrently with our exercise idea, APL, a shipping company based in Oakland, California, was attempting to conduct some type of event to highlight its Y2K readiness efforts and contacted the Coast Guard. From this initial partnership sprung an alliance to not just conduct an exercise, but also to announce the Coast Guard's national Y2K policy. A team of active, reserve and civilian Coast Guard members worked together with APL, and two other companies, ARCO and Crowley Marine, to design two days of exercises, which featured all facets of Team Coast Guard.

With only three weeks to plan and prepare, the challenge was daunting. The unit had to draft a contingency plan and develop drill scenarios all at once. A press conference had to be scheduled and three companies had to be featured in different exercises. What evolved from this potential minefield were two days of substantive drills on June 14th and 15th, featuring five different scenarios, in the busiest port complex in the United States.

The first scenario on June 14th dealt with using the proposed risk matrix and screening all the vessels that were in port. The second scenario was a Vessel Traffic Service scenario where first, the power failed, and then second, the radars and communications failed. A Coast Guard cutter offshore was used to provide the surface shipping picture for the VTS. A third scenario involved a communications failure from the command center, where messages were relayed remotely to and from an operator at the antenna high site.

The last scenario on June 14th featured a simulated valve failure resulting in a minor oil spill at the ARCO oil terminal. ARCO's drill was designed with its most likely, potential Y2K-related problem in mind.

The second day started with a Y2K-related propulsion failure on an inbound containership, the APL SINGAPORE. The SINGAPORE simulated loss of engine control due to an embedded chip and was forced to take manual control of its engines. Also, the SINGAPORE set its clocks forward to December 31, 1999 and let them roll forward to the New Year. In the words of Captain Jon Harrison, master of the SINGAPORE, "nothing happened."

The drills concluded with a press conference at the Los Angeles APL facility, which by itself is the fourth largest container port in the United States. With the APL SINGAPORE as a backdrop, RADM George Naccara, the Coast Guard's Director of Information and Technology, spoke to members of the press and maritime community about the Coast Guard's Y2K policy. The Admiral assured the public that the Coast Guard was not shutting down ports, but instead was taking a risk-based approach to Y2K. "We never wanted to arbitrarily put limits on ships without some method of assessing the risk," RADM Naccara said. "The idea is to have a consistent, nationwide approach that will protect life, property and the marine environment while recognizing the importance of ocean transportation to the nation's economy."

On a more local level, Captain Wright was very pleased with the results of the drills because of the lessons they uncovered. "The drills were not just a success because they occurred, but because we learned things that we would not have known had we not actually exercised the equipment," Captain Wright noted at the press conference. RADM Naccara concurred, remarking "The key is to have contingency plans in place and then rigorously test them."

The cumulative product of the drill was an exercise guidance template, which RADM Naccara presented to the United Nations on June 21st. This template was provided to member nations, and other Coast Guard units, as a cookbook example of how to conduct a Y2K exercise. "This exercise will become a model for others in the maritime industry to follow," RADM Naccara said. The Coast Guard once again lived up to its billing as the world's premier maritime service by stepping to the forefront and providing an example for the rest of the world to follow on preparing for Y2K.

More information on the Coast Guard's Y2K efforts can be found on the Headquarters Y2K web site at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/y2k.htm. Information on this drill can be found on the MSO-Group Los Angeles/Long Beach's web site at http://www.cglalb.com.

In Memory of Hurricane Floyd….
While ravaging the East Coast, he arrived RTC Yorktown on September 16th, 1999, and departed, cutting our
Exercise Planner's Course down to 8 days. Thanks, Floyd.

Contingency Preparedness University

LT Dan Deptula, Instructor
Contingency Preparedness School, RTC Yorktown

Welcome to CPU, home of the Pesky Planners! We enjoy a student/instructor ratio of 7 to 1, and maintain an unblemished 100% job placement after graduation . Though our sports program is still in its infancy stages, there are always challenging pick-up games at the gym, but…okay, its only a nickname. But, the courses offered through the Contingency Preparedness School in Yorktown sure do have a college level atmosphere in content and within the students who attend them. And, though the four courses offered in fiscal year 2000 (FY00) are different in scope, targeting different management levels within the Coast Guard, they definitely have their similarities too. In each class, it is necessary for each student to practice effective communication (writing and speaking), team building, leadership, negotiation, and information analysis skills. We find these important skills are as essential to the Port Level Contingency Preparedness Planner as they are to the Incident Commander in charge of a multi-agency response to a major disaster. Once these skills are learned, defining "**Key Business Drivers**", achieving "**Critical Success Factors**", incorporating **ICS** or other Response Management Systems into your plans, and truly understanding the processes of **quality preparedness** and **response** become SOP! Do you or your subordinates have the skills and training necessary for producing successful preparedness and response planning initiatives? Or, do you value new perspectives, emerging ideas, and polishing the skills that make you a valuable member to your team? Check out our Course Calendar, plan ahead for your future, and enroll today!!

Title/Location	Duration/quotas per class	1QTR	2QTR	3QTR	4QTR	Send TRNG Req to:
MS-732 Contingency Planner, Port Level (O-1 to O-3)	12 Days/20	18OCT99		**10APR00** see note 1.		Area Planning Staff
MS-733 Command & Staff (Area & District Staffs)	12 Days/20				18SEP00	Area Planning Staff
MS-735 Exercise Planner, Port Level (O-1 to O-3)	12 Days/20		24JAN00	**19JUN00** see note 1.		Area Planning Staff
MS-739 Command & Control (O-5 & O-6)	5 Days/20	15NOV99	28FEB00	22MAY00	14AUG00	Area Planning Staff

Note 1. "One-Stop Shopping" for Unit Contingency Preparedness Training Needs

Combining the Contingency Preparedness Planner (CPCP) and Exercise Planner (CPXP)

After reviewing the outgoing surveys of students attending the CPCP and CPXP courses for the last few years, we found an interesting trend. The recommendation to combine them both, primarily due to duplicate lesson blocks for returning students and the costs of time and money spent away from their units, was a common theme from our Active Duty and Reserve members alike. From the perspective of the Contingency Preparedness School staff, this certainly made sense according to budget.

In 1996, budget pressures reduced these courses down to one per year. Despite receiving some windfall in 1998 and convening these courses twice that year, funding for FY99 was again reduced and courses were cancelled. So where does that leave us? Well, it gives us the opportunity to follow your recommendation: to combine the Contingency Preparedness Planner and Exercise Planner courses in FY00.

To ensure we are able to adequately cover all essential material of both courses, yet get the most for your training dollar, our pilot course will run three (3) weeks. The convening date of this course is still undetermined. If interested in getting your new personnel, Active Duty or Reserve, into this class, contact your supervisor and your Area Planning Staff.

WWW + CP = ☺ 4U
By LT Dan Deptula,

Check out these websites!
www.receptive.com/upgrade/mlcp/dispatch.cgi/RDMDir
Work of the Coast Guard Readiness System Development Team - This team was chartered by the Coast Guard Leadership Council in September, 1999 to develop a service wide system to manage readiness.
www.disaster-resource.com/
To provide resources for Prevention and Mitigation of disasters as well as resources for Response, Resumption, Recovery and Restoration after disaster.

www.disasters.org/emgold/Library/Libframe.htm

The Virtual Library is an integration of information relating to Academia (Education), Business and Industry, Government (Federal, State and Local) and Volunteers (NGOs) in Emergency Management. This integration is intended in order to make it easier to locate resources.

www.colorado.edu/hazards/intro.html

The Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, located at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA, is a national and international clearinghouse that provides information on natural hazards and human adjustments to these risks. The center's prime goal is to increase communication among hazard/disaster researchers and those individuals, agencies, and organizations who are actively working to reduce disaster damage and suffering. The Natural Hazards Center carries out its mission in four principal areas: information dissemination, an annual workshop, research, and library services

www.comdt.uscg.mil/G-OPF/epc.htm

This is the Contingency Preparedness Program HQ homepage. View CG-wide exercise schedule for the year, Planning

Agent responsibility for the major contingencies, new CG-SAILS lessons learned program, links to other response agencies, and Y2K information. This is THE authority behind our Contingency Preparedness efforts. Check it out!!

Y2K: A quick note from HQ
Taken from G-OPF-3 website

Year 2000 Contingency Plans: It is critical that field units build effective contingencies to deal with the potential impacts of Year 2000 problems. Planning guidance for Coast Guard Business Continuity Contingency Plans (BCCP) was promulgated in COMDTINST 3010.1. The work arounds specified in BCCP's and subordinate contingency plans must be fully exercised to assure their effectiveness. The goal in these efforts is to continue to perform Coast Guard operational missions in spite of Y2K related problems. We must draw synergy from each other; successes and lessons learned from testing Y2K work arounds should be forwarded to G-OPF-3 via the chain of command.

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"That's our Y2K contingency plan?
Everyone learns how to transmit data telepathically?"

Commanding Officer (tmcp)
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Contingency
Preparedness Review